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Executive summary 
Land conflict, tenure insecurity and an inequitable distribution of land are among the most 
pressing challenges facing Cambodia today. In a country in which most people depend on 
agriculture, livestock rearing, fishing and forest products for their livelihoods, secure access to 
safe and productive land is crucial. Yet, over the past decade land conflict has increased 
dramatically, with one NGO reporting having recorded disputes involving 700,000 people 
between 2000 and 2012.Land distribution is highly unequal: In 2010 it was estimated that just 
one percent of the population owned 30 percent of Cambodia’s land.  
In addition to land-related disputes, landlessness and insecure tenure, Cambodia also has a 
significant mine and ERW contamination problem, which stems from 30 years of conflict that 
ended in the late 1990s. It also has a significant cluster munition contamination problem in the 
north-east resulting from aerial bombardment by U.S. forces between 1965 and 1975. 
Mine/ERW operators have been working in Cambodia since the late 1990s to safely remove and 
destroy mines and ERW and make land available for agriculture, housing and infrastructure 
development. 
Land release is inherently beneficial: it saves lives and frees up land for housing, agriculture and 
other uses. However, mine action actors – authorities, operators, the UN and donors – should 
nonetheless be concerned about the land rights implications of their activities in order to ensure 
that intended beneficiaries do in fact benefit in the short, medium and long-term and that land 
release does not instigate conflict or land-grabbing. Some of the specific land issues that are 
present in mine/ERW affected areas of Cambodia include: the lack of formal land tenure 
documentation over released land; land classification problems; land-related conflict; and 
released land remaining unused.  
In some respects, Cambodia’s mine action sector stands out for its decentralised, participatory 
and systematised approaches for ensuring intended beneficiaries are those most in need and 
actually benefit from released land. And several good practice lessons can be learned from 
Cambodia’s mine action actors in a range of areas, from national policy and standards to 
operations. However, while most recognise that land is an issue and have put in place some 
measures to try to prevent land-related disputes, more could be done to promote land use and 
tenure security by intended beneficiaries. 
This report includes recommendations that seek to build upon good practice and strengthen 
systems and processes to ensure mine action efforts not only do no harm, but also bring the 
maximum possible benefits to beneficiary households and the socio-economic development of 
Cambodia as a whole. The recommendations, described in detail in the report, include the 
following:  
• improving coordination between mine action and land actors, and their respective 
prioritisation processes;  
• providing land rights training for mine action actors;  
• strengthening post clearance monitoring and evaluation; and  
• improving the flexibility of current funding modalities. 
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Introduction 
Land conflict, tenure insecurity and an inequitable distribution of land are among the most 
pressing challenges facing Cambodia today. In a country in which most people depend on 
agriculture, livestock rearing, fishing and forest products for their livelihoods,1 secure access to 
safe and productive land is crucial. Yet, over the past decade land conflict has increased 
dramatically, with one NGO reporting having recorded disputes involving 700,000 people 
between 2000 and 2012.2One of the major causes of land conflict is the grant of large swaths of 
land to investors through Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) over areas already occupied and 
used by rural households or over territories belonging to indigenous communities.3Transparency 
around the issuance of ELCs is low, making it difficult to calculate precise figures; however by 
some estimates over three million hectares, of a total landmass of 17.7 million hectares – 
approximately 4 million of which is arable - have been granted under ELCs, mainly for agro-
industrial plantations.4Meanwhile, although approximately one quarter of rural households are 
land poor (owning less than half a hectare) and some 20 percent are landless,5less than 7,000 
hectares have been allocated to such households through a formal social land concession (SLC) 
process.6Land distribution is, indeed, highly unequal: In 2010 it was estimated that just one 
percent of the population owned 30 percent of Cambodia’s land.7 
Even for households that have ownership claims to land, tenure status is usually not formally 
registered. The foundational legislative framework for land registration has been in place since 
2001, and over two million titles have been issued under the Systematic Land Registration (SLR) 
process that commenced soon afterwards. Yet, with the number of land plots throughout the 
country put at roughly 10 million,8 it will take many more years to complete initial registrations. 
Further complicating matters, rates of subsequent registration (ie. upon sale or transfer of 
parcels) is alarmingly low: only about 12 percent of land transfers are officially recorded, 
meaning that the emerging land registry is already becoming out-dated.9There is also anecdotal 
evidence that a formal land title does not necessarily equate with de facto tenure security in the 
face of an ELC or other types of competing claims to the land by powerful interests. Households 
with other forms of land tenure, such as those occupying State property or renting, remain 
largely unprotected from forced eviction both in law and in practice.   
In addition to land-related disputes, landlessness and insecure land tenure, Cambodia also has 
a significant mine and ERW contamination problem, which stems from 30 years of conflict that 
ended in the late 1990s. It also has a significant cluster munition contamination problem in the 
north-east resulting from aerial bombardment by US forces between 1965 and 1975. Mine/ERW 
operators have been working in Cambodia since the late 1990s to safely remove and destroy 
mines and ERW and make land available for agriculture, housing and infrastructure 
development. 
Mine action organisations deal directly with land through their operations. They survey, clear and 
handover land, and in doing so, they interact directly with local communities and local authorities 
                                               
 
1United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Foreign Agriculture Investment Country Profile: Cambodia, 2001, p. 7. 
2Paul Vreize and KuchNaren, Carving up Cambodia, The Cambodia Daily, 10-11 March 2012. 
3 See, Licadho, The Great Cambodian Giveaway: Visualizing Land Concessions over Time website, http://www.licadho-
cambodia.org/concession_timelapse/ 
4 Cambodian Center for Human Rights, Cambodia: Land Conflict - An Overview of the Land Situation, December 2013, p. 4 
5United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Foreign Agriculture Investment Country Profile: Cambodia, 2001, p. 7. 
6AnreasNeef et al., The Politics and Ethics of Land Concessions in Rural Cambodia,’ Journal of Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics (2013) 26:1085-1103. 
7AnreasNeef et al., citing United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), Local development outlook Cambodia: Trends, 
policies, governance. Phnom Penh:, 2010. 
8 Council for Land Policy, Land Policy White Paper, Royal Government of Cambodia, 28 August 2012, p. 19.  
9 Unpublished GIZ study, 2014 
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with land-related responsibilities. Returning land that was previously inaccessible and/or unsafe 
can change its value and status, which can lead to disputes over ownership, use and access 
and in some cases, misallocation and land grabbing. Given increasing tensions and conflict over 
land and natural resources in Cambodia, to what extent do mine action organisations encounter 
land issues in mine/ERW contaminated areas and how do they respond? Do mine action 
organisations take any steps to help prevent or mitigate land-related conflict, and to help 
promote secure land tenure within affected communities? 
Background 
In 2010, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) initiated a project 
on land rights in conflict affected contexts. The purpose of the project was to examine whether 
land issues were a problem in mine/ERW affected communities, and how mine action 
organisations respond to these issues. As part of the project, GICHD commissioned several 
country case studies, including one on Cambodia. 10  The case study documented several 
lessons learned by mine action organisations, based on long-standing experience dealing with 
the intersection of land issues with mine/ERW survey and clearance operations. The case study 
also made several recommendations on strengthening consideration of land use and land rights 
issues. 
Since 2010, several changes have taken place in Cambodia with regards to land. For example, 
in June 2012, Prime Minister  Hun Sen introduced an accelerated land titling programme, known 
as Directive 001, to make half a million families official land owners by issuing land titles. The 
Government has also granted economic and mining concessions at an alarming rate to private 
companies for large-scale agriculture, mining, infrastructure development, eco-tourism, and 
special economic zones. According to the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights in Cambodia, 
“insecure land tenure, ineffective systems (court and cadastral) to handle claims related to land 
and other obstacles to access to justice, and widespread land disputes continue to be a 
challenge.”11 
Given the broader context with regards to land tenure and land rights in Cambodia, GICHD 
carried out a technical support mission in November/December 2013 to: 
• identify the main land-related problems that mine action organisations encounter during 
the course of their operations;  
• examine how these issues should and are being addressed to ensure mine action 
operations adhere to ‘do no harm’ humanitarian principles 12, and do not create or 
worsen land-related conflict;  
• document good practice and lessons learned; and  
• strengthen the links between mine action and land stakeholders in Cambodia.  
Releasing land that was previously unsafe and inaccessible due to mines/ERW is not a neutral 
activity. In many contexts, it results in a change in the land’s value, which can affect land rights 
and land use. A ‘do no harm’ approach in the mine action context therefore requires that mine 
action organisations understand their operational legal, social and economic context: For 
example, how is the land used by different groups and who has what legal rights to the land? 
                                               
 
10 GICHD (Kristen Rasmussen). Landmines and Land Rights in Cambodia, Geneva, 2010. 
11 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Secretary General, Role and achievements of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in assisting the Government and people of Cambodia in the promotion and protection of human 
rights, A/HRC/18/47, 21 September 2011. 
12 The Do No Harm framework is based on the belief that humanitarian actors should take steps to ensure that they do not make a 
situation worse through the assistance that they provide. 
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What is the potential positive and negative impact of land release on that context, such as new 
competing claims to the cleared land, including by powerful individuals or the State? 
Objectives 
The purpose of this report is to examine in greater detail how mine action organisations respond 
to land issues in Cambodia, highlight good practice and lessons learned, and propose 
recommendations on how to promote secure land tenure through land prioritisation and release 
processes. For example, are land issues identified in the priority-setting process? Do mine 
action organisations share information and have formal links with land actors? Is security of 
tenure ensured during handover processes? Do survey and post clearance monitoring teams 
collect sex and age disaggregated data from women and men about land tenure, land use and 
land-related problems that communities may face before, during and after land has been 
released, and if so, what is done with this data? Are there functioning systems in place to 
determine whether intended male and female beneficiaries are encountering land problems? If 
mine/ERW-affected communities encounter land-related problems, is there a clear process in 
place for affected communities and mine action organisations to refer these issues to the 
relevant land authorities and organisations? 
This report is based on desk-based research and interviews with key mine action and land 
stakeholders in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, Battambang and Pailin. Research was carried out by 
Sharmala Naidoo (GICHD), Natalie Bugalski (Inclusive Development International), and Chan 
Vicheth (national consultant). The report is structured as follows: 
Section 1 provides a brief overview of mine action in Cambodia, examining the nature of the 
country’s mine/ERW contamination problem, the response by the international community, and 
key policies, structures and actors governing the sector. 
Section 2 describes the main land issues that arise, or have the potential to arise, in mine and 
ERW-affected areas of Cambodia. 
Section 3 describes how mine action actors typically prevent and respond to land issues in 
mine/ERW affected communities. 
Section 4 identifies the challenges and gaps in the current mine action response to land issues. 
Section 5 contains conclusions and recommendations.  
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1. Mine action in Cambodia 
In Cambodia, mines and ERW threaten lives and livelihoods, denying safe access and use of 
land and other natural resources. Land release13 is typically undertaken to reduce the risk of 
casualties, as well as to support livelihoods and wider socio-economic development at local and 
national levels. This section provides a brief overview of the mine/ERW contamination problem 
in Cambodia and the response by national and international actors. 
1.1 Mine/ERW contamination problem 
Thirty years of conflict that ended in the 1990s left Cambodia badly affected by mines and ERW. 
Following the aerial bombardment by U.S. forces and some mine contamination between the 
mid-1960s and mid-1970s, the first significant mine-laying occurred under the Vietnamese 
occupation between 1979 and 1989. Since 1979, over 64,000 landmine and ERW casualties 
have been recorded in Cambodia. Despite a considerable reduction in casualty numbers over 
recent years, Cambodia’s mine and ERW problem continues to pose a significant safety risk and 
impede social and economic development.  
Cambodia’s anti-personnel mine 
problem is concentrated, but not 
limited to, 21 north-western districts 
along the border with Thailand. This 
includes the 1,046 km-long K5 belt, 
installed in the mid-1980s by the 
Vietnamese-backed government to 
impede the return of the insurgent 
Khmer Rouge. Reportedly, the K5 
ranks among the densest 
contamination in the world, with up 
to 2,400 mines per linear 
kilometre. 14  The precise extent of 
mine contamination in Cambodia is 
not fully known. In July 2012, data 
collected through the Baseline 
Survey (BLS), a process led by the 
Cambodian Mine Action and Victim 
Assistance Authority (CMAA) to quantify the remaining mine threat in the country, indicated that 
over 1,005 km2 of land was affected to some degree by anti-personnel mines –including 650 km2 
affected by scattered mines. A further 66 km2 was identified as contaminated only by anti-vehicle 
mines.15 
In addition to anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, Cambodia is estimated to have between 1.9 
and 5.8 million cluster munition remnants in the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country, 
along the borders with Lao PDR and Vietnam. The BLS has identified an area of 489 km2, 
especially in south-eastern Kratie province (bordering Vietnam), north-eastern Stung Treng 
province and northern Prey Vihear province. However, this estimate is likely to increase as a 
                                               
 
13 Land release is the process involved in returning land suspected of being contaminated by mines and ERW to productive and safe 
use. The land release  involves non-technical survey, technical survey and clearance activities. 
14International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munition Coalition. Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor – Cambodia: Mine 
Action (2013a). Accessible at http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/2495#_ftn1 
15Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor (2013a). 
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result of additional survey and the inclusion of data on sub-munition contamination following 
Thailand’s cross-border shelling of Cambodia in April 2011.16 
1.2 National mine action programme 
Humanitarian mine action has taken place in Cambodia since the late 1990s. Significant gains 
have been made, particularly in recent years. The number of mine/UXO related casualties has 
fallen, from 271 in 2008 to 186 in 201217.  Over 530 square kilometres of land was cleared from 
2008-201218, with steadily increasing clearance rates since 200819. 
National policies, structures and actors 
Humanitarian mine action in Cambodia is guided by the National Mine Action Strategy 2010-
2019, which has four main goals:20 
1. Reduce mine/ERW casualties and other negative impacts by allocating demining assets 
to the most affected communities and promoting risk education.  
2. Contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction by supporting local, subnational, 
and national development priorities, supporting access to care for survivors and securing the 
land rights of intended beneficiaries of clearance; (emphasis added).  
3. Promote international and regional disarmament and stability by supporting the Mine 
Ban Treaty and adhering to the Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V on 
explosive remnants of war.  
4. Ensure sustainable national capacities to adequately address the residual mine/ERW 
contamination by reviewing the institutional framework to address the residual problem, 
plugging gaps, and maintaining sustainable capacity. 
In addition to its National Mine Action Strategy, Cambodia also has national standards which 
guide mine action operations and which accredited agencies are obligated to follow. 
Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) 
The national regulatory and coordination agency for mine action is CMAA, which was 
established in 2000. CMAA’s responsibilities include: regulation and accreditation of all 
operators, strategic planning, information management, quality management and coordinating 
mine/ERW risk education and victim assistance.  
Provincial Mine Action Committees and Mine Action Planning Units 
At a sub-national level, Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and Mine Action Planning 
Units (MAPUs) are responsible for coordinating mine action operations. PMACs are inter-
department committees chaired by a Provincial Governor or a Deputy Provincial Governor.  
MAPUs are the technical assistants of the PMACs, and they work in cooperation with affected 
communities and local authorities to identify community priorities. In consultation with mine/ERW 
operators, they prepare annual clearance task lists. MAPUs and PMACs were established since 
2004 following the introduction of the 2005 Socio Economic Management Guidelines on Mine 
                                               
 
16 Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor (2013a). 
17Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor (2009, 2013a). 
18Royal Kingdom of Cambodia. The National Strategic Development Plan 2009-2013. 
19 Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor (2013a). 
20National Mine Action Strategy (NMAS) 2010-2019, Cambodia. Accessible at 
http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/nma-strat/NMAS-Cambodia-2010-2019.pdf 
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Clearance Operations. They were established partly in response to several land-related 
scandals in the mine action sector in the late 1990s and early 2000s, where cleared land 
intended for landless households was taken by high-ranking officials, including military officials.21 
Table 1: Key mine action institutions and operators in Cambodia22 
Body Situation on 1 January 2012 
National Mine Action Authority Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) 
Mine Action Centre CMAA 
International demining operators NGO: HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) 
National demining operators NGO: Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC), Cambodia Self-
Help Demining (CSHD) 
Government: National Centre for Peace Keeping Forces of the 
RCAF (Royal Cambodian Armed Forces), Mine and ERW 
Clearance (NPMEC), CSHD 
International risk education 
operators 
MAG, Spirit of Soccer 
National risk education 
operators 
National Police, Ministry of Education, World Vision Cambodia, 
Cambodian Red Cross, CMAC, NPMEC 
Humanitarian mine/ERW operators 
Land release for humanitarian purposes started in the early 1990s in Cambodia. The principal 
civilian mine/ERW operators are CMAC, Cambodia Self-Help Demining (CSHD), the HALO 
Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Norwegian Peoples Aid is no longer involved in land 
release but provides capacity building support to CMAA and is carrying out Baseline Survey in 
the north-east.23 
The Royal Cambodia Armed Forces (RCAF) have been involved in demining for many years, 
initially to support military operations and to clear land for military purposes. However, since 
1998, RCAF also clears mines/ERW for non-military purposes24 through its National Centre for 
Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMEC). NPMEC’s main function is twofold: 
urgent demining in support of government priority projects; and demining in support of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations abroad.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
21 GICHD (Rasmussen), 2010; These post clearance land issues led to the formation of pilot Land Use Planning Units (LUPUs) in 
selected provinces to ensure beneficiaries were able to access and use land after clearance. The LUPUs were replaced several 
years later by PMACs and MAPUs. 
22Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor – Cambodia, (2013a).Accessible at http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/2495#_ftn1 
23Norwegian People’s Aid – Mine Action in Cambodia. Accessible at http://www.npaid.org/Our-work/Countries/Asia/Cambodia/Mine-
Action-in-Cambodia 
24 GICHD, The Role of the Military in Mine Action, Geneva, 2003, p. 66.  
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2. Land issues in mine/ERW affected areas 
Insecure land tenure, land conflict and land seizures are a country-wide problem in Cambodia, 
including in mine/ERW affected areas. This section describes a number of interlinked key land-
related issues that impact, or have the potential to impact, on humanitarian mine action efforts 
and pose challenges to the ability for mine action actors to meet sectoral goals.  
2.1 Lack of formal land tenure documentation over released land  
While a systematic land registration programme has been underway for over a decade, the 
majority of Cambodians still do not have land title or other forms of secure land tenure. 
Households that have benefitted from land release therefore typically do not have formal land 
tenure documentation, despite many having legitimate claims to the land under Cambodian law. 
The Land Law states that people who occupied certain types of property before 31 August 2001, 
and meet a number of other conditions25, have exclusive rights to the property, which can be 
transferred to full ownership.26 Such rights are known as “possession rights” and form the legal 
basis for the grant of titles under the land registration programme. According to mine actors 
interviewed, the majority of their intended beneficiaries have been using the contaminated land 
for residential or agricultural purposes, while attempting to avoid mines/ERW, and are presumed 
by mine actors to have possession/ownership rights. While such households will be eligible to 
receive title once the systematic registration programme reaches them, until that time - perhaps 
years away - they do not have a high degree of tenure security over the released land. It is 
possible for households claiming possession rights to independently apply for title instead of 
waiting for the systematic registration programme to reach them; however the high cost of 
sporadic titling makes it inaccessible to the vast majority of Cambodian households. 
The absence of land titles or other formal documentation can mean that land release activities 
do not ultimately benefit intended beneficiaries who face tenure insecurity that manifests in 
forced evictions.27The lack of tenure documentation is particularly problematic in areas where 
land disputes are common, and areas where companies have been allocated land through 
ELCs, which may overlap or adjoin newly released land (see below).  
In other cases, landless households – rather than owners – are the intended beneficiaries of 
clearance activities. Failure to provide such households with clear land tenure documentation, 
such as a lease or social land concession,28 prior to the land being cleared can lead to the 
intended beneficiaries being denied allocated land, as the case study in Box 1 illustrates. 
 
Box 1: Ou Ro’el village, Pailin province29 
In 2006, approximately 296 landless households living in OuRo’el village made a request to an 
operator to clear contaminated land in their village. The land was unoccupied at the time and 
they required the land for housing and agriculture purposes. The local authorities agreed that 
                                               
 
25 These conditions include: the possession of the land must have started before the Land Law was 
passed on August 30, 2001; the possession must be continuous; the possession must be peaceful; the occupier must have taken 
possession in good faith (honestly); the possession must be unambiguous (clear); and the possession must be known to the public. 
26 Land Law (2001), Article 38. 
27According to the 2006 Policy Guidelines and Operational Guidelines on Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance 
Operations, intended beneficiaries are supposed to receive ownership certificates at handover; however according to interviewees, 
formal land titles are not provided during this process. 
28Land Law (2001), article 17; and Sub-decree 19 on Social Land Concessions (2003). 
29OuRo’el village is in StuengKach commune, Sala Krau district, Pailin province. 
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the land, once cleared, would be allocated to them. In 2007, the villagers visited the land to 
observe the clearance process and were surprised to find that other people were starting to 
farm parts of the land that the operator had finished clearing and that the local authorities did 
nothing to stop them. The representatives of the 296 households contacted the Deputy 
Provincial Governor (Chair of the PMAC) who reassured them that they would receive the land 
once clearance was completed. However, following clearance the land was allocated by 
commune and district officials to households from outside their village. The village 
representatives believe the Commune and District officials may have benefited personally from 
the misallocation of the land in some way, such as through unofficial payment. Although the 
OuRo’el villagers submitted a formal complaint to the Provincial Governor, the PMAC and the 
MAPU, the case remains unresolved and the families remain landless.   
2.2 Land classification problems  
There are cases where landless families have settled on State property that is contaminated. 
They reside on and/or cultivate the land despite knowing the risk of mine/ERW contamination, in 
order to meet their socio-economic needs. People who have settled on State private property 
after the legislative cut-off date (i.e. August 2001) cannot claim possession/ownership rights. In 
other cases, people have settled on contaminated land that is classified under the Land Law as 
State public property, such as forests or riverbanks, which means it cannot be privately owned.30 
Mine actors continue to encounter problems in releasing this type of land only to find it cannot be 
officially allocated to intended beneficiaries during the handover process. The beneficiaries thus 
remain highly insecure and vulnerable to forced eviction despite the considerable 
survey/clearance assets used to provide them with safe land for their housing and/or livelihood 
needs.  
In rare instances, State property has been allocated to landless households through a Social 
Land Concession (SLC).31 For State public property, it is necessary to first reclassify the land as 
State private property – an additional slow administrative step. While CMAA has intervened in a 
small number of cases to have State property reclassified and allocated as an SLC to intended 
beneficiaries of clearance, this mechanism has been used only in exceptional circumstances 
and is not standard practice. Indeed, few SLCs have been granted in Cambodia to date due to 
lack of political will and the high cost of supporting poor families to productively use newly 
allocated land. SLCs could, however, be granted more systematically to provide tenure security 
post clearance for households already using the land in question, as it is unlikely to require the 
same level of developmental support as would be necessary for families newly resettled on 
allocated land. 
2.3 Land conflict 
Land conflicts between a variety of actors are common across the country. Conflict exists 
between households, between households or communities and the State and /or powerful 
individuals, including government and military officials, and between households and domestic 
and foreign companies. Land release can instigate or exacerbate conflict by increasing the value 
of the land, which may induce disputes among neighbours, land grabbing or pressure to sell 
land. Land release can therefore unwittingly lead to tenure insecurity and related harmful 
impacts on intended beneficiaries. 
                                               
 
30Land Law (2001), article 15 and 16. 
31 Social Land Concessions are a mechanism to grant state private land to poor landless families for residential and farming 
purposes. Land Law (2001), article 17; and Sub-decree 19 on Social Land Concessions (2003). 
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In recent years, the government has granted large numbers of ELCs and mining concessions 
across a significant proportion of the country, including over existing residential and agricultural 
villages. An alarming number of concessions have been granted in the north east, home to many 
of Cambodia’s indigenous peoples, resulting in the loss of their ancestral lands and natural 
resources. Some of the areas under concession overlap with areas that are contaminated by 
mines and ERW.32This raises some important questions: is humanitarian mine action funding 
being used to clear land which will be issued to companies under economic land concessions, 
rather than being used by poor households over the long-term? What steps are mine action 
actors, including the national mine action authority, taking to ensure that intended beneficiaries 
have secure land tenure, and are not vulnerable to land grabbing? 
The map below illustrates the overlap between mine/ERW hazards based on Baseline Survey 
(areas highlighted in red), ELCs (areas highlighted in yellow) and mining concessions (areas 
highlighted in purple in north-west provinces of Oddar Meanchey and Banteay Meanchey. 
 
Map 1: ELC and mine/ERW hazards overlap in North-eastern Cambodia 
 
Legend: Areas shaded red = suspected hazardous areas (Baseline survey); areas shaded yellow: 
Economic Land Concessions (as at 2012); areas shaded purple: mining concessions (as at 2012) 
Scarce Official Development Assistance (ODA) resources used to release land may ultimately 
benefit business investors, including concessionaires or well-connected individuals. The 
following case study examines the case of households living in Bos village in Oddar Meanchey 
province, where several years post clearance, land intended for landless households was 
granted by the government as an Economic Land Concession to Angkor Sugar Company. 
  
                                               
 
32See thetimelapsemap produced by LICADHO (Cambodian League for the Defence and Promotion of Human Rights) which 
visualises the granting of Economic Land Concessions in Cambodia over time. 
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Box 2: Bos village, OddarMeanchey province33 
An operator cleared land in Bos village and released it for use in 1998. There were 47 
households living in the area at the time. By 2003, the village had grown to over 200 
households and land was allocated for residential and farming plots by the village chief and 
local officials. In 2007, villagers heard that the government had granted three economic land 
concessions to various sugar companies on adjoining land. In 2009, 119 households were 
forcibly evicted by a group of security forces, officials and others believed to be company 
workers, to make way for an economic land concession granted to Angkor Sugar Company. 
Their homes were burnt down and they lost all of their belongings and farmland. 34 While 
clearance took place well before the creation of CMAA and the MAPUs, and well before the 
land grab, this case illustrates the need to ensure that intended beneficiaries have secure land 
tenure post clearance. If the families had received secure tenure documentation as a part of 
the handover process, in the form of, for example, a social land concession, this may have 
prevented their forced eviction and displacement several years later. 
2.4 Released land not always used  
There are instances where land is released but remains unused despite handover to poor and/or 
landless beneficiaries. In some cases, beneficiaries engage in seasonal labour migration, 
leaving the land temporarily due to, for example, a lack of irrigation or developmental support, 
and then return when weather conditions are more conducive to cultivation. In other cases, 
households opt to move permanently due to the lack of infrastructure or other agricultural 
support in place, post-land release. These households are simply too poor to cultivate or 
otherwise use the released land to sustain their livelihoods. The vacated land is left vulnerable to 
seizure or competing claims by the State or third parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
33Bos village is located inKounKriel commune, Samraong district, OddarMeanchey province 
34 This case was documented by: Amnesty International,Eviction and Resistance in Cambodia: Five women tell their stories, 2011  
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3. Mine action response to land issues 
This section examines how mine action organisations prevent and respond to land issues during 
land release operations. It examines national policy and structures in place, as well as key 
activities from prioritisation to handover and post clearance assessment. 
3.1 National policy 
On paper, Cambodia has a range of policies that signal the role that mine action can and should 
play to promote poverty reduction and secure land tenure. For example: 
• The National Strategic Development Plan 2009-2013 states that mine/UXO clearance will 
remain a government priority “especially in remote areas, areas with landless farmers and 
areas with high potential for agricultural and infrastructure development. Moreover, the 
clearance of mines and UXO should be linked to the principles of equitable distribution of 
cleared land to landless farmers.” The Plan also states that one of the objectives of CMAA is 
to “monitor [the] allocation of demined land to the right beneficiaries.”35 
• Goal 2 of the National Mine Action Strategy (NMAS) focuses on ensuring mine action 
contributes to economic growth and poverty reduction, and a sub-goal refers to the need to 
“support land administration processes to secure the rights of intended beneficiaries on 
demined land.”36 
• The 2006 Policy Guidelines and Operational Guidelines on Socio-Economic 
Management of Mine Clearance Operations (herein referred to as the Guidelines) outline 
specific roles for national authorities in allocating and monitoring the use of land once it has 
been released.  
3.2 Role of authorities 
As mentioned above, the Guidelines clarify which national authorities are responsible for dealing 
with land issues in mine/ERW affected areas. For example: 
• CMAA is responsible for monitoring the use of cleared land to ensure that it is reaching 
intended beneficiaries. CMAA is also responsible for monitoring the MAPU’s coordination 
with relevant institutions in issuing legal documents and awarding ownership certificates.37 
• PMACs are responsible for follow up and coordination on the use and distribution of cleared 
land for beneficiaries and handle land-related disputes. 
• District/Municipality mine action working groups are responsible for overseeing the use and 
distribution of cleared land to the intended beneficiaries. They are also supposed to 
participate in handling disputes related to cleared land.  
• MAPUs coordinate land dispute resolution during the mine action planning process. They 
also coordinate the resolution of disputes that are identified during the post clearance 
monitoring process. 
• Local authorities (Commune Council/Sangkat) are responsible for ensuring that cleared land 
is used according to the original requests. They are also involved in dispute resolution with 
                                               
 
35Royal Government of Cambodia.National Strategic Development Plan 2009-2013.  
36Royal Government of Cambodia/CMAA. National Mine Action Strategy, 2009-2019. 
37According to interviews, in practice formal titles are not awarded. 
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regards to cleared land and report on unresolved disputes to the district or provincial 
authorities as necessary. 
No evaluation has as yet examined the extent to which national authorities carry out these roles 
and how effective they are in preventing and mediating land disputes that arise. There is 
anecdotal evidence, however, which indicates that CMAA has intervened to assist beneficiary 
communities with achieving secure land tenure. For example, in Kamrieng village, Battambang 
province38, the local authorities allegedly tried to grab cleared land following handover. The 
operator informed CMAA that only some of the intended beneficiaries received land. Following 
CMAA’s intervention, all intended beneficiaries were provided land. Mine/ERW affected 
households, such as those in Kamrieng village typically have limited or no knowledge about their 
land rights, and often lack access to effective grievance mechanisms in situations where their 
land rights are being violated. This case illustrates that land grabbing by local authorities post 
clearance does occur; that a formal grievance channel between communities and the CMAA is 
required; and that intervention by CMAA can be effective. 
3.3 Priority-setting 
Cambodia has a bottom-up prioritisation process where the coordination of mine action planning 
is decentralised to provincial level PMACs and MAPUs. These bodies coordinate with affected 
communities, operators and development partners to develop annual land release plans. This 
involves gathering information from affected young and adult men and women in the 
communities about their preferences to determine how best to allocate available resources for 
specific land release tasks. This bottom-up approach was established in part to help mitigate 
some of the land-related problems that mine action organisations encountered in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. 
 
Chart 1: Mine Clearance Planning 
and Prioritisation Process in 
Cambodia39 
 
 
 
Since 2012, the prioritisation process has consisted of the following two phases:40 
 
1. CMAA facilitates the selection of priority communes. This takes place in the 15 provinces 
where MAPUs have been established. The priority communes are selected based on the 
BLS data, with casualty-rate data also taken into account. For a proportion of communes, 
there is some flexibility. For example, the selection of priority communes may also be based 
                                               
 
38Kamrieng village, Kamrieng Commune, Kamrieng district, Battambang 
39Source: CMAA. Post Clearance Monitoring Consolidated Report, MAPUs, October 2011-February 2012. 
40Interview with CMAA on 26 February 2014. 
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on donor requirements and practical factors such as the existence of a development project 
that can continue if the area is cleared. At least 75% of priority communes are identified 
based on BLS and casualty data alone. About 25% of communes are selected based on 
other factors such as donor requirements. 
 
2. The next step involves the selection of minefields, which is facilitated by the MAPUs. The 
MAPUs select minefields in association with the operators and based on meetings with 
affected communities, district and provincial level governments and development partners. 
Priority minefields are typically selected based on local village and commune needs, e.g. 
desire to build a school or road. This local level prioritisation is integrated with the commune 
investment planning process.  
 
During the minefield prioritisation and survey and clearance planning process, MAPU staff verify 
land classification status before land is prioritised for clearance, to help reduce the possibility of 
issues arising post clearance. For example, State public land might be excluded from 
prioritisation if it cannot be converted to a Social Land Concession and made available for 
private use with secure tenure. 41 The MAPUs also take into account issues regarding land 
ownership and conflict during the second stage of prioritisation. If there is a land dispute in a 
particular area, it is not prioritised until the conflict is resolved by local authorities. A minefield 
with unclear ownership of the land will also be excluded from the work plan. 
3.4 Baseline/non-technical survey 
In 2009, Cambodia commenced a Baseline Non-Technical Survey in order to improve the 
identification of suspected hazardous areas and enable improved integration into land use 
planning initiatives based on credible evidence. The baseline survey of areas west of the 
Mekong was completed at the end of 2012. NPA is the only operator carrying out baseline 
survey in the north-eastern provinces to identify the extent of ERW contamination. 
 
A review of the standard IMSMA forms used for the baseline survey reveals that little 
consideration is given to land issues, which was a missed opportunity to collect data that could 
be used to inform prioritisation and operational planning. For example: 
• Baseline Survey Report Form I: Village Information does not include any land-related fields 
• Baseline Survey Report Form II: Mine Area/Residual Threat Land (Polygon) Information 
includes one question about the potential future use of land. However, the form does not 
include questions about the type of land (eg forest, agriculture, etc.), current land use, land 
tenure/rights, previous land-related disputes, future potential for land-related conflict, 
intended beneficiaries, land value, etc.  
In addition to the standard BLS forms generated through IMSMA, some mine/ERW operators 
use their own survey forms that include additional fields, enabling them to collect supplementary 
data prior to survey/clearance, which informs their operations and report on results. For 
example, one operator uses the following forms: 
• Baseline Focus Group Discussion Form 
• Baseline Household Questionnaire 
• Direct Beneficiary List 
• Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) Assessment 
                                               
 
41 GICHD (Kristen Rassmussen), 2010. 
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• Mid Clearance Assessment Report 
• Impact Assessment Household Questionnaire 
 
The Baseline Household Questionnaire includes the following questions: 
• How much land does your household have? 
• Does your household have a land title(s) for the land the operator will return? 
• In your estimation, how much land does your household own? 
• What is the intended land use once the SHA has been returned? 
• Is there a development partner to support land use after land has been returned? 
• Are there any problems foreseen in the beneficiaries being able to use the returned land? 
 
The Baseline Focus Group Discussion Form includes questions such as: 
• Do you use the land the operator has returned? 
• If you don’t use some/all of the released land, why not? 
 
Box 3: Good practice in a complex province 
Ratanakiri, in the north-east of Cambodia, has one of the worst rates of land conflict and land 
grabbing, with economic land concessions and mining concessions covering a large proportion 
of the province. It is also home to many indigenous communities with customary land tenure 
governance systems that cover their ancestral lands and access to resources. There is 
significant overlap between land that is subject to concessions and land owned by indigenous 
communities according to their customary tenure system. Ratanakiri is also the second most 
heavily bombed province in the country and consequently has a serious ERW contamination 
problem.  
One operator working in the north-east has a comprehensive process in place for gathering 
information about land issues, including Economic Land Concessions, in the villages where it is 
working. The operator spends time in the village, finding out the community’s problems needs 
and plans. The operator communicates with local NGOs working on development, land rights 
and indigenous peoples issues in the province. It also obtains information from local 
government officials, including development plans and information about planned economic 
land concessions in the area. 
If the operator discovers that a concession is planned or has already been granted, staff inform 
the affected village(s) and local NGOs. It will not carry out subsurface clearance in an area 
owned by or concessioned to a company or wealthy outsider. 
The operator also includes the following questions in its survey forms: 
• Type of land ownership? 
• Expected benefits from clearance? 
• Will use of land change? 
• Will ownership change? 
• Will clearance create any discussion or conflict? 
• Has any conflict occurred before because of land issues or CM or ERW in the village? 
 
Six to twelve months after clearance, the operator conducts a post-clearance survey. If any 
land issues are identified, the operator alerts relevant NGOs and MAPU. 
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3.5 Handover 
Handover refers to the process involved in handing released land (through survey and/or 
clearance) back to local authorities, communities and land owners/users.42 Handover can have 
important implications for land use and tenure security more generally. When handover 
processes are unclear, inconsistent or lack community involvement, this can create opportunities 
for land-related disputes and even land grabbing. In addition, if handover takes place with too 
much of a delay after land release with limited or no community participation, this can lead to 
land not being used by beneficiaries, as they may not be informed in a timely manner that the 
land is safe to use or may not have sufficient confidence in the land release process.  
Cambodia is one of only a few mine/ERW-affected countries that have clear and transparent 
procedures in place for handover. Handover procedures are formally standardised and outlined 
in the Policy Guidelines and Operational Guidelines on Socio-economic Management of Mine 
Clearance Operations, which were developed in 2006 and last updated in 2011.43 According to 
the Guidelines, MAPUs are responsible for coordinating with local authorities, mine/ERW 
operators and development agencies regarding handover of demined areas, and for 
coordinating with relevant provincial departments regarding the allocation of demined land to 
beneficiaries. Furthermore, the Guidelines provide detailed guidance regarding the handover 
process under Operational Guideline 9 – “Handover of Demined Land to Local Authority” and 
Operational Guideline 12 – “Handover of Plot Plans to Beneficiaries”.44 
Handover takes place in two stages – first released land is handed over to local authorities, and 
then plots of land are issued to beneficiary households. Handover ceremonies are held, usually 
for one day, and typically on the cleared land or in the village, involving representatives from the 
mine/ERW operator, MAPU, Provincial Department of Land Management, Urban Planning and 
Construction (PDLMUPC), and concerned partner organisations, as well as the village chief, 
commune chief and the District Governor. Although the time-frame in which handover takes 
place is not stipulated in the Guidelines, mine/ERW operators in Cambodia typically undertake 
handover within one day to a month after land release is complete.  
According to the Guidelines, during the ceremony, a representative from the PDLMUPC 
provides information about land laws, social land concessions, the land registration process and 
follow up activities. Once the handover ceremony is held, plot plans are issued to beneficiaries 
during a ceremony which involves the MAPU, the Department of Land Management, 
development agencies working in the area, village chiefs and beneficiary communities. During 
this meeting, the Department of Land Management explains the purpose of the plot plan and the 
land use conditions. If relevant, development agencies discuss development projects planned in 
the area. Plots of land are then issued to beneficiaries. The MAPU takes note of which released 
land has been issued to beneficiaries and this is shared with CMAA and the PMAC. 
3.6 Post-clearance monitoring  
Post clearance assessment typically involves returning to mine/ERW affected areas 6-12 
months after the area has been released to collect data on the short to medium term outcomes 
resulting from the land release process. For example, data on the following is collected:  
                                               
 
42 For more information about handover procedures, see Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) and GICHD. Handover of 
Released Land: Common Procedures and Good Practices, 2013. 
43GMAP/GICHD, 2012. 
44Royal Government of Cambodia, CMAA.Socio-economic Guidelines on Mine Clearance Operations, 2006. 
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• Are intended beneficiaries using the land?  
• How is the land being used? 
• Is the land being used as intended? 
• Do beneficiaries require support to use the land productively, eg training, tools, seeds, etc.?  
• Have beneficiaries encountered any problems in regards to land use/ownership, eg disputes 
over ownership, intimidation, rising value of land, land-grabbing, etc.? 
• How much land is still held by the intended beneficiaries?  
This type of data can be used to also determine whether for example, the right tasks are being 
prioritised for survey/clearance. If for example, the post clearance assessment finds that land is 
not being used once it is handed over, then consideration should be given to adjusting the 
prioritisation system to ensure that tasks with a higher likelihood of post clearance land use are 
prioritised in future. 
The stated purpose of PCM is to check that “cleared land is being used by the intended 
beneficiaries (men, women, boys and girls) for the proposed purpose as defined during the 
planning process.”45However, the PCM form used by MAPUs does not disaggregate date by sex 
and age, which represents a missed opportunity to enhance data accuracy and to obtain a   
comprehensive picture of the impact of land release on male and female beneficiaries. 
CMAA started conducting PCM in 2006 using two in-house Phnom Penh-based socio-economic 
teams. In 2009, CMAA delegated the PCM function to the MAPUs. The MAPUs are required to 
monitor all tasks in their provinces, identify lessons learned and provide CMAA with completed 
PCM forms. The findings of the PCM should be shared with development partners, mine action 
organisations and local authorities to resolve land issues and improve mine clearance  
planning.46 Not all clearance tasks are subject to PCM because in some cases, there is no 
functioning MAPU or because the MAPU does not have the capacity to conduct PCM, such as in 
the north-east. PCM is currently conducted in eight provinces. 
Are the right questions being asked? 
MAPUs are responsible for conducting PCM approximately six months following handover, using 
a standard form. In addition to the land-related questions already included in the PCM form, 
which are listed above, additional questions could also be included in order to enable MAPUs 
and mine action actors more generally to prevent land-related disputes and promote tenure 
security, such as: 
• Do beneficiaries feel secure on their land (ie. do they have confident in their tenure status?)  
If not, why not? Are they under the threat of eviction? 
• Has the beneficiary had an opportunity to gain formal land tenure documentation?  
Notably, land-related questions corresponding to those included in the PCM form are not 
included in the Baseline Survey forms or the Land Release form. This makes it difficult to assess 
the impacts of land release over time. Collecting corresponding data before and after land 
release would facilitate the tracking of land issues and the assessment of impact on tenure 
security and land use. It is also important to make sure that both men and women are asked 
these questions, as answers might be quite different, and to ensure that beneficiary data is 
disaggregated by sex and age. 
                                               
 
45CMAA. Post Clearance Monitoring Consolidated Report, MAPUs, October 2011 - February 2012. 
46CMAA. Post Clearance Monitoring Consolidated Report, MAPUs, October 2011 - February 2012. 
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In addition to the post clearance monitoring undertaken by the MAPUs, some operators conduct 
their own post clearance assessment, including on the potential for land disputes and land 
grabbing post clearance. For example, one operator conducts pre and post clearance 
assessment for each task, and the survey forms used include specific land related questions, 
such as: 
• What is the intended land use once the Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) has been 
returned?   
• Is there a development partner (NGO, government agency or commercial company) to 
support land use after land has been returned? 
• Are there any problems foreseen in the beneficiaries being able to use returned land?                     
• In your estimation, how much land does your household own? 
• Does your household have a land title(s) for the land that will be returned? 
• Has the returned land had any positive effect on you and/or your family life? 
• Any negative effect on you/your family? (eg disputes about land use, disputes about land 
ownership) 
 
Is the PCM process transparent? 
The data collected from the PCM forms is analysed by CMAA’s Socio Economic Planning and 
Database management department. The findings are then summarised into an annual 
consolidated post clearance monitoring report. The reports produced for 2011 and 2012 provide 
data on the: 
• Number of sites cleared by different organisations 
• Location of areas cleared and their size 
• Use of cleared land 
• Beneficiaries of cleared land, by sex 
While the PCM form includes land-related questions, it is noteworthy that the 2011 and 2012 
PCM reports make no reference at all to land issues. This gives the impression that intended 
beneficiaries have not encountered problems with land tenure or disputes post clearance, which 
is surprising given the scale of land-related disputes and insecure land tenure in Cambodia. This 
also contradicts interviews undertaken during the GICHD assessment mission with national and 
community-based land actors which indicated that some land issues do arise in mine/ERW 
affected areas, and raises several questions about the PCM process: 
• If land issues are a problem in mine/ERW affected areas, why is this not reflected in the 
consolidated PCM reports? 
• If MAPUs are aware of these issues, to what extent do they record this information in the 
PCM forms and share this data with CMAA? 
• Given that MAPUs fall under the authority of the PMAC/Provincial Governor, are MAPUs 
able to freely report land issues to CMAA? 
• Do MAPUs have sufficient capacity and knowledge to handle and/or refer land-related 
disputes to the relevant authorities and organisations in a timely manner? 
Due to capacity constraints, CMAA monitors PCM through random spot checks of about 10% of 
all released fields. The CMAA reports that this monitoring system indicates that PCM is done 
accurately and that land issues are rare. However, without a more comprehensive independent 
verification and evaluation process, these conclusions may be called into question. 
22|29 
4. Gaps and opportunities in response to land issues 
The purpose of this section is to outline the main gaps and opportunities identified with regard to 
how mine action actors respond to land issues in affected contexts. Section 5 concludes with a 
corresponding list of recommendations to address these challenges and strengthen the 
response by mine action actors to land rights issues. 
4.1 Priority-setting 
Currently, according to CMAA, land subject to dispute is excluded from the work plan until such 
time as the dispute is resolved by local authorities. While there is validity to ensuring that 
clearance does not occur on disputed land and does not exacerbate land disputes, caution 
should be exercised to ensure that land-poor households are not denied the benefits of 
clearance, purely because of a conflicting claim, that may or may not be legitimate. 
 
According to the CMAA, land that is not owned is also excluded from the workplan. Households 
that do not have possession/ownership rights to land are often the poorest and most vulnerable 
and should not be further disadvantaged by being excluded from the work plan and denied the 
benefits of clearance. Instead, MAPUs and other relevant actors are recommended to work with 
the provincial department of land management to identify an appropriate tenure form to secure 
the rights of households to released land, which may include, for example, use rights, rental or a 
social land concession.  
 
Only one operator currently systematically investigates whether identified land falls within an 
actual or planned economic land concession or mining concession. Obtaining information about 
planned concessions, including maps, is essential during the prioritisation process in order to 
ensure that scarce humanitarian resources are not being used to clear land for the benefit of a 
company.  
4.2 Weak coordination between land and mine action authorities and 
processes 
Related to the above, there is a lack of coordination between mine action priority setting and 
land administration systems, such as systematic land registration and social land concession 
processes. When prioritisation takes place at national and local levels, there is no engagement 
of land authorities to see how to coordinate this process with the selection of systematic land 
registration adjudication areas. This poses a risk as well as a missed opportunity since priorities 
for both clearance and adjudication areas for land registration are set through provincial and 
district authorities. Moreover, unclaimed cleared land could be made available to landless 
households through Social Land Concessions, helping the government to meet objectives for a 
more equitable distribution of land.  
 
Box 4: Households receive title over released land 
 
In May 2012, the Prime Minister issued an instruction known as Directive 01BB, which ordered 
a review of economic land concessions. As part of the implementation of the directive, the 
Prime Minister announced a land titling campaign involving the rapid measurement of plots and 
issuance of land titles to households whose land is located inside economic land concessions 
(ELCs). As the programme was implemented, it was expanded to households not situated 
inside ELCs. Some of these households had recently had their land cleared of mines. 
 
One village that benefited from both Directive 01BB and mine action is Kanhchang in Sung 
Commune,Samlotdistrict,Battambang. Eleven hectares of land was released and distributed to 
15 families, who, in the same year, also received land documentation through the directive. 
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Families reported feeling more secure with the land receipts and were eagerly anticipating the 
distribution of titles, promised to arriveafter harvesting season. They felt that the land tenure 
documentation was important because they had heard about land disputes in other parts of 
Samlot, which had engendered some nervousness about their tenure security. Titles, they felt, 
would help ensure that the released land could be used productively and with confidence that it 
would not be taken from them by a company or powerful individual. 
 
While the positive experience of Kanhchang village was coincidental, the issuance of title or 
other secure tenure documentation over released land could be systematised with better 
coordination between mine action authorities and land administration authorities.  
 
4.3 Survey 
Standard IMSMA forms for Baseline/Non-Technical Survey, Land Release and Post Clearance 
Monitoring do not systematically include key land-related questions. While some operators use 
their own forms that do include relevant questions, these are not widely shared or systematised. 
Importantly, this data is not systematically shared with CMAA. Therefore, the ability of mine 
action actors to identify and prevent their operations from worsening a land dispute or increasing 
tenure insecurity is generally weak. Some operators do ask the right questions and have 
mitigation processes in place, which is good practice that others can learn from. For example, 
one operator explained that when staff members collect data about land-related issues that 
require follow-up, for example with regards to an ELC in a mine/ERW-affected area, this 
information is shared with community representatives, local authorities and NGOs working in the 
area. 
4.4 Post-clearance monitoring 
The extent to which land problems are widespread in mine/ERW affected areas is unclear. The 
PCM reports for 2011 and 2012 do not indicate any analysis of the positive or negative impact of 
land release on tenure security in mine/ERW affected areas. The reports include no reference to 
land issues or tenure security despite the proliferation of ELCs and mining concessions over 
occupied land and land conflicts throughout the country. This raises questions about the efficacy 
and effectiveness of the PCM process. For example, if MAPUs fall under the responsibility of 
Provincial Governors, and if Provincial Governors or high ranking officials close to the Provincial 
Governor are involved in land grabbing/disputes, are MAPUs able to freely report to CMAA 
about land issues? What incentives or disincentives exist that may influence transparent, open 
and accurate PCM? 
Furthermore, PCM is typically carried out only 6-12 months after land release, with no additional 
assessment beyond this period. In a context where tenure security is weak, and where land 
access, use and ownership are frequently contested, how can mine action actors be sure that 
the beneficiaries they are trying to assist are actually benefiting in the mid to longer term? 
Only some operators conduct their own additional post clearance assessment, which is also 
often within a twelve month period. This is partly due to short term funding modalities, which do 
not facilitate post clearance assessment beyond the length of the funding period. No 
assessment of who is benefitting from cleared land two to five years later has been conducted 
since mine action began in Cambodia in the early 1990s, despite the proliferation of land conflict 
since that time. It is therefore difficult to conclude what outcomes have been achieved in terms 
of development and land tenure. Without a clear idea of how land is being used post clearance 
in the medium to long-term, there is a real risk that humanitarian mine action funding could be 
facilitating the allocation of released land to powerful individuals or companies, through, for 
example, ELCs. 
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4.5 Current funding modalities 
The current funding modalities in place for mine action in Cambodia act as a disincentive for the 
adoption of risk mitigation strategies such as verification of priority setting; pre-clearance 
assessments of tenure security; comprehensive PCM; support for land use development; and 
support to obtain tenure documentation. For example, Phase II of UNDP’s multi-donor trust fund, 
Clearing for Results, encourages operators to perform based on efficiency outputs. The Request 
for Proposals for CFR II, issued in February 2014, for mine clearance projects in Banteay 
Meanchey, Battambang and Pailin provinces, lists a number of criteria against which mine/ERW 
operators will be evaluated. The emphasis is on clearing the maximum number of square meters 
in the shortest timeframe possible for the lowest cost, as opposed to also promoting post 
clearance land use and tenure security for vulnerable and landless households. If donors do not 
also value and place an emphasis on land use and tenure security post land release, this means 
there are no incentives in place to promote secure land tenure when land is released. The 
consequence of the current efficiency-focused funding modality is the significant risk that funds 
are ultimately being used to benefit powerful actors and companies that seize or illegitimately 
acquire released land, displacing intended beneficiaries.  
4.6 Lack of checks and balances 
MAPU and PMAC processes have many positive attributes but are of little support to households 
or communities that find themselves in a land conflict with local authorities, powerful actors or 
the State. MAPUs, operating under the auspices Provincial Governor, may be manipulated or 
rendered powerless in the case of certain types land conflict. MAPU’s should have a stronger 
link to CMAA, and be able to report problems directly to CMAA without being vetted by the 
Provincial Governor. Also, bottom-up MAPU planning processes, while widely recognised as 
participatory, may be open to corruption and diverted by the priorities of local powerful actors. 
4.7 Lack of land law and land rights awareness  
Despite the fact that MAPUs and other mine action actors inherently affect land use, access and 
tenure through their work, very few mine action actors interviewed appeared to have a good 
understanding of Land Law basics, including who is eligible for title under the land law, and what 
other tenure forms are available. While dispute resolution mechanisms do exist within the land 
sector (eg. the Administrative Committee and Cadastral Commission), awareness about these 
mechanisms also appears to be lacking.  
The lack of land law and rights awareness amongst mine action actors means that not only is 
there a risk that some activities are not fully consistent with the law, but also that mine action 
actors are unable to raise awareness amongst beneficiaries about their land rights and 
opportunities for strengthening their land tenure status or resolving disputes. This lack of legal 
awareness is a major missed opportunity that is easily rectified through land law training of 
MAPUs, operators and other key actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
25|29 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
Land release is inherently beneficial: it saves lives and frees up land for housing, agriculture and 
other uses. However, mine action actors – authorities, operators and donors – should 
nonetheless be concerned about the land rights implications of their activities in order to ensure 
that intended beneficiaries do in fact benefit in the short, medium and long-term and that land 
release does not instigate conflict or land-grabbing.  
One of the stated objectives of mine action in Cambodia is to promote development and the 
equitable distribution of land to landless households. At a minimum, mine action actors have a 
responsibility to ensure the assistance they provide is not making intended beneficiaries worse 
off. Humanitarian mine action funding is supposed to release land for productive use. It should 
not be used to facilitate ELCs. Mine action actors should therefore have rigorous procedures in 
place to facilitate and promote tenure security and demonstrate the development outcomes 
resulting from their operations. 
In some respects, Cambodia’s mine action sector stands out for its decentralised, participatory 
and systematised approaches for ensuring intended beneficiaries are those most in need and 
actually receive released land. And several good practice lessons can be learned from 
Cambodia’s mine action actors in a range of areas, from national policy and standards to 
operations. 
The following recommendations are intended to build upon these good practices and strengthen 
systems and processes to ensure mine action efforts not only do no harm, but also bring the 
maximum possible benefits to beneficiary households and the socio-economic development of 
Cambodia as a whole.  
CMAA 
Improve coordination to promote tenure security 
• Strengthen links between CMAA and the MAPUs in terms of information sharing on land 
issues. 
• Improve coordination with the Ministry of Land Management to seek out opportunities for 
alignment between the Systematic Land Registration process and the annual mine action 
planning process. In particular, opportunities for aligning prioritisation for mine clearance and 
the selection of SLR adjudication areas should be explored.  
• For landless households occupying State land for their housing and livelihood needs, 
coordinate with the Ministry of Land Management and other relevant actors to identify an 
appropriate secure form of tenure, such as rental, use rights or social land concession. 
• As a part of the annual priority-setting process, include the identification of available 
contaminated land that could be allocated to landless households once released through a 
Social Land Concession. Communicate possibilities to the Ministry of Land and coordinate 
agreed upon efforts to clear and allocate land.  
• Provide mine/ERW affected communities with information about existing grievance 
mechanisms. Where communities may be at risk of land grabbing, mine action actors should 
link them to land rights organisations and institutions, including organisations that can 
provide them with education about their land rights and advocacy support. 
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Provide MAPUs with land law training and offer training to other actors including 
operators 
 
Strengthen post-clearance monitoring 
• Strengthen the post clearance monitoring system: 
o Include specific questions about land in non-technical survey and PCM forms in 
order to capture data about land use and land tenure pre and post clearance. Ensure 
this data is disaggregated by sex and age. 
o Expand the timeframe for PCM beyond 6-12 months in order to monitor longer-term 
development and land tenure outcomes resulting from clearance, eg 2-3 years.  
o Raise the awareness of donors regarding the importance of PCM assessment and 
the need for greater flexibility with funding timeframes. 
Conduct an evaluation on post clearance development outcomes 
• In order to determine the prevalence of land issues in areas that were previously 
contaminated with mines/ERW, conduct an evaluation on how land is being used, and who 
has access to and control over the land several years post clearance. The evaluation could 
cover a set time period of between 2006 - 2010, since the Guidelines on the Socio Economic 
Management of Mine Action were adopted in 2006. This assessment should include mine 
and ERW contaminated areas.  
• The findings should be shared with mine action actors, as well as development partners and 
land authorities, and lessons learned should be used to strengthen response to land issues. 
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Operators (NGO mine/ERW operators and NPMEC) 
• Use community liaison and non-technical survey as an opportunity to check whether there is 
potential for land-related disputes or other land issues. Gather information from women and 
men about land issues in the communities where you are tasked to do survey/clearance. 
• Refer land disputes to local authorities, MAPUs or where appropriate to NGOs able to 
provide land rights training and advocacy support. 
• Raise the awareness of donors regarding the importance of post clearance assessment and 
the need for greater flexibility with funding timeframes. 
Donors 
Funding modalities 
• Donors need to provide multi-year funding, which facilitates post clearance assessment 
beyond the timeframe of the funds provided.  
• Donors should request that their implementing agencies demonstrate how their operations 
contribute to development and secure land tenure, and what measures they have in place to 
ensure their operations do not create or exacerbate land-related conflict. 
• Given that there is some overlap in the remaining mine/ERW contaminated areas to be 
cleared and existing Economic Land Concessions mine action actors including donors need 
to consider the implications of using humanitarian mine action funding to release land that 
may be used for an Economic Land Concession, as opposed to benefiting poor households. 
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Appendix 2 – Mission schedule 
Nov 24 – Phnom Penh - Assessment team preparatory meeting 
 
Nov 25 – Phnom Penh 
CMAA: Chan Rotha, Chhiv Lim (and team), Prom PopheakMongkol 
CMAC: HengRatana and PrakSokhonn 
NPMEC (RCAF): Major General Ken Sosavoeun, Director of Information and ERW Department 
 
Nov 26 - Siem Reap 
HALO Trust: Adam Jasinski, Leng Saren 
Cambodia Self Help Demining: Aki Ra and Bill Morse 
MAPU and PMAC Siem Reap  
Provincial Department of Land Management (Siem Reap) 
Jesuit Refugee Service: Denise Coughlan  
 
Nov 27 - Pailin 
Interviews in: 
• Ou Ro’el Village, Sala Krau district, Pailin 
• Tom Noup and Phnom Kreing Villages, SteungTeung Commune, Pailin 
 
Nov 28 – Battambang 
MAG: Kong Chivin, Community Liaison Coordinator; Khan Thavireak, Community Liaison Officer 
Observed two MAG post clearance assessment meetings: 
• Kanhehang Village, Sung Commune, Samlot District, Battambang 
• Ta Sanh Cheung Village, Ta Sanh Commune, Samlot District, Battambang 
 
Nov 29 – Battambang 
MAPU and PMAC Battambang 
Provincial Department of Agriculture 
CMAC: PringPanharith 
Provincial Department of Land Management 
 
Nov 30 – Phnom Penh 
Golden West Humanitarian Foundation: Allen Tan 
BACTEC: PhalkunPich 
 
Dec 1 
Former Austcare: Davy Srin 
CMAA: Eang Kamrang 
Former BHP Billington: Dave McCracken (via skype) 
 
Dec 2  
MAG: Alistair Moir, Clare O’Reilly; CARE: Jan Noorlander 
Former MAG/NPA Ruth Bottomley; Kristen Rassmussen, DCA 
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy: Cheap Sour, DG for Energy 
AusAID/DFAT: Nicholas Wolf 
 
Dec 3 
NPA: Tang Sun Hao, Jan Erik Stoa 
DfID: Bryony Mathew 
UNDP: Tong Try 
 
Dec 4 
OHCHR: Benjamin Rutledge, Tem Pharath 
Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction: H.E. SarSovann, Secretary of State 
GIZ/LASED: Andreas Groetchel 
 
Dec 5 
Japanese Embassy: Shinichi Tamamitsu, KazujiroUzawa 
Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC): Chan Soveth 
Japan Mine Action Service: Hiromi Fuchikami, TakakuraFumitoshi, Touch Bora 
